4.20 On informal consultation, some stakeholders criticised this decision on the basis that it is unusual to characterise a direction such as the judge's original jury instruction as a "court order". Furthermore, concerns were raised about the extent to which the current procedure used for this type of contempt protects the alleged contemnor's article 5 or 6 rights under the ECHR. 39 There may also be concerns that there is a lack of clarity about the definition of this contempt. Nonetheless, it is clear from Dallas that jurors who deliberately and knowingly disobey the direction of the judge not to undertake research on the internet are in contempt of court.
The problem
4.21 Jurors who seek information from outside the courtroom about the case that they are trying may act from a variety of motives. Evidence of motives can be found in the explanations jurors themselves have given when found to have improperly accessed the internet during trial. In addition, various authors speculate about other motives which could be relevant. There is some anecdotal evidence that jurors may do so deliberately because they are keen to find out as much about the case as possible in order to "bolster their confidence" 40 and reach the "right" verdict. 41 They seek to be "good jurors" -thoroughly prepared and well-equipped with the information that will allow them to reach a verdict -but do so in a misguided manner unfortunately, ignorant of the rules of evidence and the necessity to reach a verdict based only on what they have heard in court, even where that evidence might be incomplete or unclear. In some cases, this motivation appears to be connected to the jurors' failure to understand the trial judge's directions on the law: for example, one juror researched joint criminal enterprise on the internet and reported his findings back to his fellow jurors. 42 In a similar vein, some jurors may feel that information is being withheld from them by the parties in the case, and that they need a fuller picture in order properly to 39 See para 4.69 below. reach a verdict. 43 It may be correct that information is being withheld -for example where there is inadmissible bad character evidence -but again these jurors have not appreciated or perhaps accepted the rules of evidence and the rationale for them. Such jurors may have had insufficient explanation of the reason why research is prohibited. 44 There may be yet another group of jurors who did not understand the direction that was given prohibiting them from undertaking research or their role as finders of fact, or perhaps they were unable to translate what the direction meant in practice in terms of what is prohibited and what is not. 45 Finally, there may of course be some jurors who ignore the judge's direction simply out of curiosity 46 or even in bad faith.
4.22 Historically, this may have been less problematic than it is today. In the preinternet age, an unauthorised visit to the crime scene might have involved an inconvenient journey at the end of the court day, with the risk that the juror would be observed making the visit. These days, detailed maps and photographs of street scenes of, not only England and Wales, but almost anywhere in the world, are accessible easily, anonymously and instantly. 47 Likewise, whereas uncovering media reports of a defendant's previous convictions would previously have required a visit to the national newspaper archive at the British Library at Colindale, an internet search engine might now produce scores of results about a particular individual's past misdemeanours within seconds. 48 As we explain in chapter 3, internet access and use is widespread in the UK today. 49 In consequence, insulating the jury from irrelevant material or inadmissible evidence has become significantly more difficult. 50 coined the colloquial phrase a "google mistrial" to identify cases where internet research by a juror led to a retrial. 4.23 Evidence as to the prevalence of this problem is difficult to obtain. 52 There is very limited reliable, empirical, research from overseas, 53 and only two studies in England and Wales have ever been undertaken to examine this issue. Furthermore, different studies have tended to reach very different conclusions. In England and Wales, Professor Thomas found in 2010 that in high-profile cases, 12% of jurors surveyed admitted that they had looked for information on the internet about the case they were trying while it was underway, whilst in nonhigh-profile cases, 5% admitted doing so. 54 Perhaps equally worryingly, Thomas' study found that "when asked about whether they would know what to do if something improper occurred during jury deliberations, almost half of the jurors (48%) said they either would not know what to do or were uncertain". Five cases in which the jury made any external inquiries about factual material. These inquiries included visiting the scene of the crime and bringing into the jury room explanatory brochures about legal and factual issues. 4.25 The jurors made these enquiries despite a jury video, jury booklet and judge's summing up all explaining that a verdict must be reached by considering only the evidence that was heard in court. The New Zealand research also found cases of jurors undertaking their own research about the law, for example, through the use of a legal dictionary. As the researchers identified:
While the directions not to conduct external inquiries were adhered to in a majority of cases, there was no evidence that the directions themselves made a difference to the actions of juries in this respect. It was also found that 26% of jurors in high profile cases and 13% in non-high profile cases admitted that "they saw media reports of their case on the internet during the trial" which may suggest that some were reluctant to admit having actively looked for such reports (our emphasis). By the same token, the cases which result in juries being discharged or which reach the Court of Appeal are only those where the juror's behaviour has come to light. We do not know how many jurors engage in this behaviour and go undiscovered. responsibility for the outcome of the trial, including counsel and the judge, and in an appropriate case, the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. This leads to the second principle, the entitlement of both the prosecution and the defence to a fair opportunity to address all the material considered by the jury when reaching its verdict. Such an opportunity is essential to our concept of a fair trial. 61 4.30 Indeed, whilst the principles have common law origins, there are also implications for a defendant's article 6 rights where jurors seek external material. Article 6 of the ECHR requires a trial before an independent and impartial tribunal, which is both unbiased in fact and in appearance; 62 a requirement which may be violated if a juror obtains prejudicial material about the defendant. Furthermore, article 6 includes an "implied" right to cross-examine witnesses, 63 and a requirement that the court "inform the parties of the evidence taken into account" in reaching its decision, allowing the parties an opportunity to make submissions on the case. 4.31 In some cases, external material which has been obtained by a jury may be insignificant -it could be innocuous and cause prejudice to neither party, or it may be related to an issue which is entirely peripheral to those raised at trial. However, where the material is prejudicial, or where the jury relies on such material in order to reach a verdict, this is likely to amount to a violation of article 6. Here, the prosecution and the defence have been denied the opportunity to challenge such evidence and to address the jury as to the weight to attach to it in their deliberations. As one commentator explained, the parties may be defending against "the unseen enemy of internet gossip and innuendo". 65 Furthermore, the parties have a right to know the basis on which the jury reached its decision. 66 In the absence of the jury giving a reasoned verdict (as a professional judicial tribunal would), the evidence before the court and the judge's summing up become the public record on which the jury must be assumed to have based its decision. 4.32 Whilst jurors have a right to receive information as part of their right to freedom of expression under article 10 of the ECHR, this is clearly subject to protecting the legitimate aims of "maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary" (which includes the jury) and "the protection of the reputation or rights of others"
including the defendant's article 6 rights. Additionally, this problem has implications for the confidence of the public in the fair administration of criminal justice through the jury trial.
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Proposed reforms
4.33 Elsewhere in this chapter, we have detailed proposals to expand the practical measures, such as information and warnings, that might be used to prevent jurors from engaging in this behaviour. 69 However, since there is no single solution to this problem, it is necessary to consider what the legal response should be where preventative measures fail, and jurors do undertake research about the case that they are trying. Indeed, some have questioned whether it is realistic to seek to prevent jurors from researching aspects of the case that they are trying on the internet. Preventative measures can only assist those jurors "who are willing to abide by" the judge's directions. 70 The Law Commission in 2002 explained that there were clearly difficulties with preventing jurors from accessing the internet, describing finding information on the web as "characteristic of society today". 71 4.34 In some ways, this risk can be partially mitigated by imposing restrictions on the media, limiting the information that they have on their internet archives and, therefore, making it less likely that jurors will be able to uncover prejudicial material. Such restrictions were imposed recently through an injunction granted by Mr Justice Fulford in the case of Harwood. 72 The injunction ordered certain publishers temporarily to remove material from their websites which had first appeared in advance of active proceedings commencing (and, therefore, at the time, would not have amounted to strict liability contempt by publication) but which had remained on the website once proceedings were active. We consider this issue in more detail in our chapters on modern media and contempt by publication. 4.35 Whilst there may be concerns about the compatibility of such mechanisms with the media's article 10 rights, using such mechanisms in respect of specific webpages, for the limited duration of the trial, would make it more difficult for jurors to find prejudicial material. Such orders are not on their own a panacea. 4.39 We doubt that such an offence would engage jurors' article 8 and 10 rights, given that a specific offence would fall a long way short of a prohibition on using the internet in and of itself. We of course recognise that such a prohibition would be impossible to enforce and wholly inappropriate, given that access to the internet has, for many, become an essential part of every day living. The offence would only be a prohibition limited in time (the period of jury service) and content (information related to the case the juror is trying). Furthermore, we consider that our proposals in many ways would enhance jurors' confidence in their use of the internet, because there would be greater clarity about what is permitted. 79 In any event, if the prohibition does engage articles 8 and 10, we consider that such a limited prohibition would be a proportionate measure, necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 80 We also consider that the prosecution of such conduct would be made fairer, and less likely to be subject to challenge on the ground of ECHR incompatibility, by the use of the normal criminal process, instead of the contempt jurisdiction, which we propose below. concerns that creating such an offence would make jurors more reluctant to admit their misconduct and their fellow jurors more reluctant to report any concerns, which would actively work against uncovering cases of miscarriages of justice. The criminalisation of research by jurors may, therefore, work against the precise interest that the offence seeks to protect, namely the right to a fair trial and the risk of wrongful conviction, if it is more difficult for the courts to discover that the misconduct occurred. 82 Moreover, in jurisdictions that have introduced offences, their success has been doubted. For example, in New South Wales some commentators have argued that it does not appear to have deterred jurors from undertaking their own research.
83 Do consultees consider that a specific offence of intentionally seeking information related to the case that the juror is trying should be introduced? 78 It may also clarify the anomaly raised by A T H Smith in relation to the Dallas case, namely whether Dallas' contempt was an offence within the meaning of s 8( 
